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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction

in this

matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-4-10(i) (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues presented by this petition and the applicable
standard of appellate review are as follows:
(1)

Whether

or

not

the

Board

of

Review

erred

in

affirming the Administrative Law Judge's decision that the
Petitioner,

Norman

Miller

dba

Norm

Miller

Used

Cars

(hereinafter referred to as "Miller"), did not have good
cause to file a late appeal.
Board

of

Review's

decision

Standard of Review: Whether
is

supported

by

substantial

evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the
Court and is reasonable. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (4) (1953,
as amended); Armstrong v. Dep't of Employment Security, 834
P.2d 562 (Utah App. 1992).
(2)

Whether

or

not

the

Board

of

Review

erred

in

affirming the Administrative Law Judge's decision that Mr.
Miller did not have good cause to request rescheduling of the
March 9, 1992 hearing.

Standard of Review: Whether Board of

Review's decision is supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the Court and is

1

reasonable. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4) (1953, as amended);
Armstrong v. Dep't of Employment Security. 834 P.2d 562 (Utah
App. 1992).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES. ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Constitutional Provisions:
None.
Statutes:
Utah Code Ann. §35-4-10(a),(b),(d),(e),(h), and (i).
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)
Ordinances:
None.
Rules:
UAC R562-6C-7
UAC R562-6C-8
UAC R562-6c-10.1.a
UAC R562-6c-10.2.a
UAC R562-6C-11.4
UAC R562-10b-l
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The

case before

the

Court results

from

an Audit

Determination dated October 23, 199j6 in which the respondent,
Department of Employment Security of the Industrial Commission of
Utah, assessed the petitioner, Norman Miller dba Norm Miller Used
Cars, contributions, interest, and penalties

in the sum of

$6,054.90 for unreported wages during the years 1988 through 1990.
Mr. Miller did not file a written appeal until December
11, 1992.

A hearing was set for March 9, 1992 which Mr. Miller

failed to attend.

On March 27, 1992 Mr. Miller mailed a written

request to reschedule the hearing. On May 13, 1992 a hearing was
held before the administrative law judge, Kenneth A. Major, on
whether or not good cause existed for Mr. Miller's late appeal and
for his failure to appear at the March 9, 1992 hearing.

The

Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Miller did not have
good cause to reschedule a hearing, and, in the alternative, did
not file a timely appeal and did not have good cause for late
filing.
Mr. Miller then appealed to the Board of Review who
affirmed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge and the case
is now before the Court on a Petition for Review.
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The following facts are material to a consideration of
the questions presented:
(1)

On or about October 23, 1991, the Department of

Employment Security mailed a Notice of Audit Determination,
together with Schedules of Unreported Wages for the years
1988 through 1990, to Mr. Miller at P.O. Box 392, Lehi, Utah
84043-0392.

Decision of Administrative Law Judge as set

forth in Record for Petition for Review and as adopted by
Board of Review (hereincifter referred to as "ALJ/Record on
Appeal"), p. 37.
(2)

The

contributions,

Notice

of

interest,

Audit
and

Determination

penalties

in

the

assessed
sum

of

$6,054.90, and notified Mr. Miller that the decision became
final within ten (10) days unless Mr. Miller filed a written
appeal.
(3)

ALJ/Record on Appeal, p. 37; Record on Appeal 7-8.
On November 1, 1991 Mr. Miller called the field

auditor, James Alexander

(hereinafter referred to as the

"auditor"), and notified him that he had just received the
Notice

of

Audit

Determination

from

his

accountant.

ALJ/Record on Appeal, p. 37.
(4)

The auditor explained to Mr. Miller that he would

be required to file a written appeal specifying the reasons
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for the appeal.

The auditor also granted Mr. Miller an

extension to file the appeal, the time of which
supported by substantial evidence.

is not

Hearing Transcript, p.

5-8; Record on Appeal, 30-33; Record on Appeal, p. 9 (Exhibit
6a) .
(5)
the

Mr. Miller called the auditor again at which time

auditor

reiterated

the procedure

to

file

a written

appeal; however, when such calls occurred was not determined.
Hearing Transcript, p. 8; Record on Appeal, p. 33.
(6)
11,

1991

Mr. Miller mailed a letter of appeal on December
setting

forth

the

reasons

for

his

appeal.

ALJ/Record on Appeal, p. 37.
(7)

The Department of Employment Security sent notice

to Mr. Miller notifying him that a hearing was set for the
matter on March 9, 1992 at the Provo Job Service Office;
however, when notice was sent was not established in the
proceedings.
(8)

Record on Appeal, p. 19 (Exhibit A - l ) .

The notice of hearing included instructions which

notified Mr. Miller that if he failed to attend the hearing,
a decision on the matter would nevertheless be issued and
that he would have seven days within which to request that
the hearing be rescheduled.

5

ALJ/Record on Appeal, p. 36.

(9)
calendar

Mr. Miller erroneously recorded hearing date on his
for March

19, 1992 rather

than March

9,

1992.

ALJ/Record on Appeal, p. 36.
(10) Mr. Miller failed to appear at the March 9, 1992
hearing, and immediately upon discovering the error a few
days later, Mr. Miller telephoned the Administrative

Law

Judge to request another hearing to which the Administrative
Law Judge notified Mr. Miller that he must make such request
in writing and explain why he failed to appear.

ALJ/Record

on Appeal, p. 36.
(11) The Administrative Law Judge did not notify Mr.
Miller of the necessity to file the request within 7 days of
the

hearing

and

shortly

after

speaking

with

the

Administrative Law Judge concerning the hearing, Mr. Miller
received a decision pursuant to the March 9, 1992 hearing
which stated he had 30 days to file an appeal.

Mr. Miller

believed that was the controlling time limit.

Record on

Appeal, p. 21

(Exhibit B) .

Hearing Transcript, pp. 3-4;

Record on Appeal, pp. 28-29.
(12) Pursuant
directions,

Mr.

to
Miller

the

Administrative

sent

the

written

Law

Judge's

request

for

rescheduling to the Administrative Law Judge on March 27,
1992.

ALJ/Record on Appeal, p. 36.
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(13) On May 13, 1992 a hearing was held at the Provo
Job Service office before the Administrative Law Judge.
ALJ/Record on Appeal, p. 36.
(14) In a decision rendered on or about May 22, 1992,
the Administrative Law Judge held that Mr. Miller did not
have

good

cause

alternative,

that

to

request

the

rescheduling,

Appeals

Tribunal

or,

did

in

not

the
have

jurisdiction over the matter under Utah Code Ann. §35-410(b) (1953, as amended) as a result of Mr. Miller's failure
to file a timely appeal and the fact that he did not have
good cause to file a timely appeal.

ALJ/Record on Appeal,

p. 36-37.
(15) On June 22, 1992 the Board of Review acknowledged
receipt of Mr. Miller's appeal on the issues of whether or
not

he

had

good

cause

for

the

late

appeal

to

the

Administrative Law Judge and whether Mr. Miller had good
cause for failing to attend the March 9, 1992 hearing.
Record on Appeal, p. 46.
(16) On September 1, 1992 the Board of Review mailed its
decision

to Mr. Miller

Administrative Law Judge.

affirming

the

decision

Record on Appeal, p. 48.

7
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I.:

The Board of Review's affirmance of the ALJ's

decision that Mr. Miller did not have good cause to file a late
appeal is not reasonable since the Board's findings regarding the
alleged 10-day extension time are not supported by substantial
evidence given the contradictory nature of the note signed by the
field auditor regarding the cippeal, the failure of the Board to
identify the dates on which Mr. Miller spoke with the auditor
subsequent to November 11, 1991, and given Mr. Miller's testimony
that he mailed the written appeal as soon as he was notified by
the auditor that he needed to do so. In addition, the ALJ failed
to elicit all relevant facts at the hearing.
Moreover, the Board's affirmance is also not reasonable
nor supported by substantial evidence in light of the misleading
statements of the field auditor in regard to the nature of the
appeal and the amount of information Mr. Miller needed to gather
in support of his appeal.
Point II,: The Board of Review's decision affirming the
ALJ's

decision

that

good

cause

did

not

exist

to

request

rescheduling is not supported by substantial evidence and is
clearly

unreasonable

in

light

of

(1)

the

lack

of

any

substantiating evidence indicating that notice of the March 9,
1992 hearing was mailed to Mr. Miller at least 7 days prior to the

8

hearing as required by R562-6c-10.1.a, (2) the ALJ's failure to
warn Mr, Miller regarding his time constraints, and
Miller's subsequent receipt of the March

(3) Mr.

11, 1992 decision

notifying him that he had 30 days within which to appeal the March
9, 1992 decision which resulted in confusion as to the time limit
within which Mr. Miller had to reschedule the hearing.

ARGUMENT
I. THE BOARD OF REVIEW ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE'S DECISION THAT MR. MILLER DID NOT HAVE GOOD CAUSE TO
FILE A LATE APPEAL.
A.

Section 35-4-10 of the Utah Code and the Rules
promulgated by the Industrial Commission govern Mr.
Miller's appeal.
Pursuant to Section 35-4-10, Utah Code Ann, (1953, as

amended) , the review of a decision or determination in cases
involving contribution liability, as in the case of Mr. Miller,
shall first be made by the Industrial Commission (hereinafter
referred to as the "Commission") or its authorized representative.
After a decision is reached notice thereof is to be given to the
employer.

The decision made pursuant to the review is the final

decision of the Commission unless, within ten (10) days after the
date of notification or mailing, the employer files a notice of
appeal to an administrative law judge (hereinafter referred to as
the "ALJ").

Utah Code Ann. §35-4-10 (a); (b) (1953, as amended).
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After affording the parties with reasonable opportunity
for a fair hearing, the ALJ is required to make findings and
conclusions, and on that basis, affirm, modify, or reverse the
determination. Notice and a copy of the decision and findings is
to be promptly provided the parties.

The decision is the final

decision of the Commission unless, within ten (10) days after the
date of mailing the notice to the parties1 last known addresses,
the employer files an application for appeal to the Board of
Review.

Utah Code Ann. §35-4-10 (b) ; (d) (1953, as amended).
Upon reviewing the evidence previously submitted and any

additional evidence it requires, the Board of Review may affirm,
modify, or reverse the decision of the ALJ.

The Board of Review

is then required to promptly notify the parties of its decision,
together with its findings and conclusions.

The decision of the

Board of Review is final unless, within ten

(10) days after

mailing notice to the parties' last known address, the employer
files a Petition for Review.

Utah Code Ann. §35-4-10 (d) ; (h)

(1953, as amended).
In addition to the foregoing statutory provisions,
appeals regarding determinations involving contribution liability
are subject to the rules prescribed

by the Commission for

determining the rights of the parties.

Utah Code Ann. §35-4-10

(e) (1953, as amended).

Pursuant to R562-10b-l of the Utah
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Administrative Code (UAC), R562-6C shall apply to appeals of
contribution decisions as well as appeals of benefit decisions.
R562-6C-7 provides an appellant the opportunity to contest a
finding that his appeal was not filed within the time allowed as
follows:
When it appears that an appeal may not have been
filed within the time allowed by the Act or these Rules,
the appellant will be notified and given an opportunity
to show that the appeal was timely or was delayed for
good cause. . . •
Pursuant to R562-6c-8, "[a] late appeal may be considered on its
merits if it is determined that the appeal was delayed for good
cause."

The rule further provides that good cause is limited to

the following circumstances:
1.
The appeal was filed within 10 days of actual
receipt of the decision if such receipt was beyond the
original appeal period and not the result of willful neglect;
or
2.
The delay in filing the appeal was due to
circumstances beyond the control of the appellant; or
3.
The appellant delayed filing the appeal for
circumstances which were compelling and reasonable.
In

the

case

before

the

Court,

the

Department

of

Employment Security (hereinafter referred to as the "Department")
issued a Notice of Audit Determination dated October 23, 1991,
together with Schedules of Unreported Wages for the years 1988
through 1990. Record of Petition for Review to the Utah Court of
Appeals from the Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of
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Employment

Security

(hereinafter

Appeal"), pp. 1-10, 32.

referred

to

as

"Record

on

The Notice stated that Mr. Miller's

business failed to report all employment of the company resulting
in an assessment to Mr. Miller of contributions, interest, and
penalties ($6,054.90).

Record on Appeal, p. 7.

Consistent with

the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §35-4-10(a) (1953, as amended),
the Notice informed Mr. Miller that the decision would become
final unless, within 10 days from the date of mailing, Mr. Miller
filed a written appeal setting forth the grounds upon which the
appeal is made. Record on Appeal, p. 8. On November 1, 1991 the
auditor received a telephone call from Mr. Miller who notified the
auditor that he just received the Notice of Audit Determination
from Mr. Miller's accountant.

Reporter's Transcript of May 13,

1992 Hearing (hereinafter referred to as "Hearing Transcript"),
p. 7; Record on Appeal, p. 32.
B.

The Board of Review's findings that Mr. Miller was
granted only a 10-day extension within which he could
file an appeal is not supported by substantial evidence.
Pursuant to the findings of the Administrative Law Judge

("ALJ") dated May 22, 1992, which findings were adopted by the
Board of Review in Case No. 92-BR-237-T, the auditor gave Mr.
Miller an extension of only ten (10) additional days from the date
of the call within which Mr. Miller could file a written appeal.
These

findings,

however,

are

not

12

supported

by

substantial

evidence, and therefore, appropriate relief should be granted to
Mr. Miller.
Pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act,
relief shall be granted if "the agency action is based upon a
determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court."

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)

(1953, as amended) . See also Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d
134, 137 (Utah App. 1992) . Pursuant to the decision of this Court
in Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, " [substantial evidence
is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.1"

776 P.2d 63, 68 (quoting

Idaho State Insurance Fund v. Hunicutt, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (Idaho
1985)).
In challenging the findings of fact, Mr. Miller must
marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that
despite the supporting facts, the ALJ's findings are not supported
by substantial evidence.

First National Bank v. County Board of

Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990).

The evidence supporting

the ALJ's findings regarding an extension of time came exclusively
from the testimony of the Department's field auditor, James
Alexander, taken at the hearing conducted by the ALJ on May 13,
1992 at the Provo Job Service Center.
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The testimony of the

auditor supporting the ALJ's findings in regard to the extension
period was as follows:
AUDITOR:

. . . [Mr. Miller] had called me on November 1st
to indicate that he had just obtained the
Determination letters and that he had some time
constraints.
I informed him that it was the
requirement of, as stated in the letter and of the
Department that a written appeal needed to be filed
and that such written appeal needed to be sent to
this Department. Because of his statement that the
had not received the Notice until just that date,
having gone to his accountant's office and picked
up the, the materials that were there at his
accountant's office, he had indicated to me at that
point that he had not received his, the employer's
copy. I gave him at that point in time 10 days
from that November 1st date in which to file a
written appeal verbally over the telephone.

ALJ:

So you extended the appeal period by 10 days?

AUDITOR:

Yes, sir.

ALJ:

And would that have been extended to what date
then?

AUDITOR:

That would have then been extended to the 11th of
November.

ALJ:

And did you receive an appeal from him within that
time frame?

AUDITOR:

No, sir, I did not.

ALJ:

And did you have communication with Mr. Miller
after November 11th?

AUDITOR:

He did call me on two occasions, the dates I do not
have available at this time, but he did call me on
two occasions wh-, and both cases I told him that
he needed to file a written appeal immediately and
that timeliness had become an issue in terms of
filing the appeal.
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ALJ:

You indicated you told him that the timeliness had
become an issue also?

AUDITOR:

Yes, sir, I did.

ALJ:

And when did you actually receive an appeal from
Miller?

AUDITOR:

The postmark that we dated on the 11th of December,
we received it, that was after the Field Audit
Distribution Desk had already sent the audit to be
processed.

ALJ:

Okay, anything further you'd like to state concerning the timeliness of the appellant's appeal?

AUDITOR:

None, sir.

Hearing Transcript, pp. 7-8; Record on Appeal, pp. 32-33.

No

other evidence appears on the record in support of the ALJ's
findings in this regard.
Mr. Miller's testimony at the May 13th hearing, on the
other hand, does not support the findings that only a ten-day
extension was granted.

Mr. Miller's testimony proceeded as

follows:
ALJ:

. . . Would you explain why you waited beyond 10
days in which to file your appeal?

MILLER:

Well, I, yea, I think it was Mr. Alexander I talked
to, I called him up there two or three times in
regards to this and then he told me later that I
had to file in a written appeal and so when he told
me that, that when I filed the written appeal.

ALJ:

And when did you first have conversation with him?

15

MILLER:

I donft have an exact record of it but it was
within a few days after I got this [Notice of Audit
Determination].

ALJ:

And he told, did he tell you at that time to file
a written appeal?

MILLER:

No.

ALJ:

Okay, when did he first tell you to file a written
appeal?

MILLER:

Well, I don't know but I filed it after we'd had
the conversation, I wrote this request the next day
after I, or somewhere near that, it was right
shortly after that that I wrote the request in, on
the, on the appeal.

* * *

ALJ:

Is there a reason why you waited until December
11th to file the appeal?

MILLER:

Well, like I said, I'd been in contact with Mr.
Alexander two or three times in regards to it and
he's the one that instructed me to, to send him a
written request for a, an appeal.

Hearing Transcript, pp. 5-6; Record on Appeal, pp. 3 0-31. As the
testimony of Mr. Miller evidences, Mr. Miller was indeed given an
extension of time within which to file an appeal.

However,

pursuant to Mr. Miller's testimony, a specific time frame was not
given.
If

the

testimony

of

Mr.

Miller

and

the

auditor

constituted the only evidence* in regard to the appeal, it is clear
the Court could not substitute its judgment for that of the Board
of Review since deference will be afforded the Board of Review
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where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence.
However, although the testimony of Mr. Miller is not sufficient
in itself to upset the findings of the Board of Review, when taken
in light of the "whole record before the court/' it is clear that
the ALJ's findings that Mr. Miller was only granted a 10-day
extension are not supported by substantial evidence.
Exhibit 6a is a copy of the letter Mr. Miller mailed to
the auditor "appealing" the Audit Determination.

The copy of the

letter reflects, however, a note attached thereto and signed by
the field auditor, James Alexander, which indicated the following:
"Norm Miller Used Cars - Hold til 11-ie- 22 - Sending a letter."
The information contained on this note clearly contradicts the
testimony of the auditor and the findings of the Board regarding
an extension of only 10 days.
auditor, therefore,

In light of the note by the field

a reasonable mind

could

not accept the

testimony of the auditor as adequate evidence to support the
findings of the Board of Review regarding an extension of only ten
days.

See Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68

(Utah App. 1989).

Indeed, the note more readily corroborates

Mr. Miller's testimony that he called the auditor on several
occasions and kept him informed as to his progress in the appeal.
Moreover, although the ALJ examined the auditor quite
thoroughly as to whether or not an extension had been granted and
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as to the time period of that extensionf he did not examine Mr.
Miller with respect to that issue other than to inquire as to why
he had failed to file within the 10-day time limit.
established

under

Utah

law,

that

"where

one

It is well

party

in

an

administrative hearing is not represented by counsel, this court
has acknowledged that the officer conducting the hearing has 'an
affirmative duty to elicit all relevant facts, including those
favorable and unfavorable to the party that is not represented.1"
Nelson v. Dep't of Employment Security. 801 P.2d 158, 163 (Utah
App. 1990) (quoting Ellison. Inc. v. Board of Review. 749 P.2d
1280, 1285 (Utah App. 1988)).
represented by an attorney.

In this case, neither party was
However, the case upon which the

court relied in both Nelson and Ellision. Inc. did not limit this
duty to those cases in which only one party was represented by
counsel.

See Vidal v. Harris. 637 F.2d 710, 713 (9th Cir. 1981).

Indeed, the United States District Court for the District of Utah
in a Social Security disability case, cited favorably Vidal v.
Harris and concluded that an ALJ's failure to elicit all relevant
facts may result
developed.
1984).

in the record not being

fully and fairly

Stevenson v. Heckler. 588 F.Supp. 980, 983 (Dist. Ut.

Moreover, in light of R562-6c-10.2.a's requirement that

"[a]11 issues relevant to the* appeal will be considered and passed
upon," the ALJ's duty to elicit all relevant facts should be
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extended to all cases in which a party is not represented by
counsel.

The ALJ's failure, therefore, to elicit further facts

from Mr. Miller further prejudiced him, the record not being fully
and fairly developed in that regard.
C.

Mr, Miller had good cause to file a late appeal of the
Audit Determination.
In Pacheco v. Board of Review. 717 P.2d 712 (Utah 1986),

the Supreme Court of Utah, operating under the more stringent
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review, held that the ALJ's
findings that good

cause did not exist were arbitrary and

capricious where the petitioner, Connie Pacheco, had immediately
notified the hearing officer of her intent to appeal and was not
specifically told that her failure to file by a certain date would
preclude her from being heard on the merits.

Like Pacheco, Mr.

Miller herein immediately notified the auditor of his intent to
appeal the Audit Determination.

Moreover, because the Board of

Review's findings regarding an extension of time are not supported
by substantial evidence, the Board of Review's findings that good
cause did not exist for Mr. Miller's failure to file a timely
appeal are neither supported by substantial evidence nor are they
reasonable.
Furthermore, the record supports the fact that Mr.
Miller was misled as to what the field auditor required of him.
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Although the auditor testified that sometime after November 11,
1991 he notified Mr. Miller on two occasions "that he needed to
file a written appeal immedicitely and that timeliness had become
an issue in terms of filing the appeal," the auditor could not
identify the dates on which this occurred.
p. 8; Record on Review, p. 33.

Hearing Transcript,

The Board's finding that good

cause did not exist for filing a late appeal is not, therefore,
supported by substantial evidence nor is it reasonable when
considered in light of the facts that (1) the Board's findings
regarding the alleged 10-day extension time are not supported by
substantial evidence, (2) the Board failed to identify the dates
on which Mr. Miller spoke with the auditor subsequent to November
11, 1991, and (3) pursuant to Mr. Miller's testimony, he mailed
the written appeal as soon as he was notified by the auditor that
he needed to do so.

Hearing Transcript, p. 5; Record on Review,

p. 30.
Moreover, unlike the case in Arevalo v. Department of
Employment Security, 745 P.2d 847, 848 (Utah App. 1987), wherein
the petitioner was unable to explain why he filed an appeal almost
three weeks late, Mr. Miller, in addition to his communications
with the field auditor, notified the auditor that he needed
additional time in order to gather the necessary information to
support his appeal.

Record on Appeal, p. 42.
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Indeed, as

evidenced by the Schedules of Unreported Wages admitted into
evidence at the May 13, 1992 hearing, Mr. Miller was required to
examine business records over a period of three years covering
more than one hundred (100) different individuals.

While the

Department conducted the audit of Mr. Miller's business over a
period of months, Mr. Miller was allegedly expected to provide the
grounds upon which he appealed the Department's determinations
within a matter of days.

If Mr. Miller was not required to

provide such detailed information, the record does not reflect
that he was ever notified of that fact. Certainly, the necessity
of reviewing

and obtaining business records and

information

covering a period of three years and over one hundred individuals,
together with the conversations with the ALJ regarding the appeal,
constitute circumstances which are compelling and reasonable under
R562-6c-8 of the Utah Administrative Code.
For the foregoing reasons, therefore, the Board of
Review's decision affirming the decision of the ALJ

is not

supported by substantial evidence and is not reasonable upon a
review of the record.

Moreover, little doubt can be had that Mr.

Miller has been substantially prejudiced by the decision of the
Board of Review in this regard.
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II. THE BOARD OF REVIEW ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE'S DECISION THAT MR. MILLER DID NOT HAVE GOOD CAUSE
TO REQUEST RESCHEDULING OF THE MARCH 9, 1992 HEARING.
Pursuant to R562-6C-11.4

of the Utah Administrative

Code, a party who has failed to participate at a hearing before
an administrative law judge may, within seven days after the date
of a scheduled hearing, make a written request for reopening the
hearing which will be granted if good cause is shown for failing
to participate.

The rule further provides that "[i]f the request

for reopening is not filed within seven days, reopening will not
be granted unless the party can show good cause for failing to
make

the

request

within

the

seven-day

time

limitation."

Moreover, pursuant to R562-6C-11.4(b), good cause does not include
such things as the following:
(1) Failure to read and follow instructions on the
notice of hearing,
(2) Failure to arremge personal circumstances such
as transportation or child care,
(3) Failure to arrcinge for receipt or distribution
of mail,
(4) Failure to delegate responsibility for
participation in the hearing,
(5) Forgetfulness.
In the case before* the Court, Mr. Miller testified at
the May 13, 1992 hearing before the ALJ that he failed to appear
at the March 9, 1992 hearing because he erroneously circled March
19, 1992 rather than March 9, 1992 as the hearing date.
Transcript, p. 3; Record on Appeal, p. 28.
-22-

Hearing

He further testified

that in preparing for the hearing approximately three days after
March

9,

1992, he

discovered

his

error

at which

time he

immediately called the ALJ who informed Mr. Miller to write
another request for another hearing date. Hearing Transcript, pp.
3-4; Record on Appeal, pp. 28-29.

Mr. Miller admits to having

probably received the hearing notice which included instructions
regarding the time period within which to make a written request
to reschedule the hearing and a copy of such notice was admitted
into evidence as Exhibits A-l and A-2.

Hearing Transcript, p. 3;

Record on Appeal, pp. 19-20, 28. The evidence introduced at the
May 13, 1992 hearing also included Mr. Miller's request for a new
hearing date which was postmarked March 27, 1992.

Record on

Appeal, p. 22.
In response to the ALJ's inquiry as to why he failed to
mail a request for rescheduling until March 27, 1992, Mr. Miller
indicated that he believed he had 30 days based on the appeal
information included with the decision made pursuant to the March
9, 1992 hearing which was dated and mailed on March 11, 1992.
Hearing Transcript, p. 4; Record on Appeal, p. 29.

The decision

provided that it would become final "unless, within thirty days
from the date of this decision, further written appeal is made to
the Board of Review . . . setting forth the grounds upon which the
appeal is made." Record on Appeal, p. 21 (emphasis in original).
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Mr. Miller, therefore, first received the notice of hearing which
included the hearing instructions, later spoke with the ALJ who
informed him to file a written request for another hearing, and
then received the decision of the ALJ pursuant to the March 9th
hearing he failed to attend, which decision stated he had 30 days
to appeal.

Moreover, the record does not reflect that when Mr.

Miller called the ALJ a few days after the hearing, that the ALJ
notified Mr. Miller that he needed to send the written request
within seven days of the hearing.

Not unlike the case in Pacheco

v. Board of Review, good cause for the delay existed where the ALJ
failed to give Mr. Miller express warning that a delay would
foreclose his opportunity for another hearing. 717 P.2d 712, 71415 (Utah 1986).
Furthermore, the notice mailed to Mr. Miller indicating
the date of the March 9, 1992 hearing does not indicate the date
on which it was mailed to Mr. Miller, providing only that it was
"Dated and Mailed by: ncg."

Record on Appeal, p. 19. Moreover,

neither the Board of Review nor the ALJ made any findings in that
regard which raises serious concerns regarding compliance with the
rules promulgated by the Commission as well as due process. While
it cannot be disputed that Mr. Miller did in fact receive the
notice, when he received it was not determined by the Board of
Review.

Pursuant to R562-6c-10.l.a of the Utah Administrative
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Code, "[a]11 interested parties will be notified by mail at least
seven days prior to the hearing . . . . • •

There is no evidence

in the record whatsoever as to when notice was mailed to Mr,
Miller,

to

The

foregoing

facts,

therefore,

clearly

constitute much more than a mere failure to read and follow
instructions or forgetfulness.

The Board of Review's decision

affirming the ALJ's findings that good cause does not exist for
Mr, Miller's failure to appear at the March 9, 1992 hearing, is
not, therefore, supported by substantial evidence and is clearly
unreasonable in light of (1) lack of any substantiating evidence
indicating when the notice of hearing was mailed to Mr. Miller,
(2) the ALJ's failure to warn Mr. Miller regarding his time
constraints, and (3) Mr. Miller's subsequent receipt of the March
11, 1992 decision notifying him that he had 3 0 days within which
to appeal the March 9, 1992 decision.
Mr. Miller has indeed been substantially prejudiced by
the Board's decision affirming the decision of the ALJ, which, as
set forth above, is not supported by substantial evidence and is
clearly unreasonable upon a review of the whole record, if not
arbitrary and capricious.
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CONCLUSION
NOW, THEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that the
Board of Review's decision in Case No. 92-BR-237-T affirming the
Administrative Law Judge's decision in Case No. 92-A-2565-T which
held

that Mr. Miller

does not have good

cause to request

rescheduling of a hearing, and in the alternative, that Mr. Miller
failed to file a timely appeal and did not have good cause for
late filing, be reversed and that this case be remanded to the
Industrial Commission for an appeal on the merits of the case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //^day of February, 1993.
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

J^f^e^vS^. Gray^T^
sys for i^ppe
Attorneys
Appellant-Mr. Miller
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Jeffrey S. Gray, hereby certify that on the 11th day
of February, 1993 I served two (2) copies of the attached Brief
of

Petitioner, mailing

the

same

by

first

class mail with

sufficient postage prepaid to Lorin R. Blauer, Attorney for
Respondent, at the following address:
Lorin R. Blauer
Special Assistant Attorney General
The Industrial Commission of Utah
Department of Employment Security
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 11600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

/ttorrreys for Appellant-Petitioner

ADDENDUM A
DECISION OF BOARD OF REVIEW

THE INDUSTRIAL OCMflSSXGN OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SBCORTIY
APPEALS TRIBUNAL
DECISION OF AIimnSIRKEIVE IAW JUDGE

Norm Miller Used Cars
ATIN: Norman Miller
PO Box 392
Lehi, UT 84043
DATE OF DETERMINATION:

March 11, 1992

DATE OF APPEAL: March 27, 1992

Enop. No-

8-129629-0

Case No.

92-A-2565-T

DATE OF HEARING: March 13, 1992
PLACE OF HEARING:

Provo, UT

APPEARANCES: Appellant and Department Representative
ISSUE:

Whether the appellant had good cause for failing to attend the original
hearing and whether the employer's appeal was filed in a timely manner
or had good cause to file a late appeal.

Timeliness of the appeal is an issue to be determined in accordance with Section
35-4-10 (b) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Rules pertaining thereto.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
The Appeals Tribunal sent notice to the appellant of a hearing to be held on
March 9, 1992 at the Provo Job Service office.
A statement of hearing
instructions acxxxnpanied the notice. The instructions informed the appellant if
he failed to attend, a decision on the matter would be issued on the information
available to the Administrative Law Judge. The instructions further explained if
the appellant failed to appear he must request in writing within seven days for
the hearing to be rescheduled.
When the appellant received the hearing notice, he erroneously recorded the
hearing date upon his calendar. The appellant did not appear at the hearing.
Since the appellant failed to appear, the Tribunal issued a decision based upon
the information available. The Tribunal issued the decision on March 11, 1992.
A few days after the hearing, the appellant called the Administrative Law Judge
to request the hearing to be rescheduled. The Administrative Law Judge explained
the request must be in writing with an explanation as to why he did not appear as
scheduled. The claimant sent written response on March 27, 1992.
On October 23, 1991, the Department issued a Notice of Audit Determination
assessing the appellant contributions, interest and penalties.
The decision
informed the appellant that the decision becomes final within ten days unless a

8-129629-0
92-A-2565-T
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written appeal is filed in writing. The auditor who performed the audit had
expressed verbally to the appellants accountant on several occasions the results
of his audit and the procedure for appeal before he issued his decision in
writing.
On November 1 the auditor received a telephone call from the appellant who
indicated he just received the decision from his accountant.
The auditor
explained the need for the written appeal. The auditor gave the appellant an
extension of ten days in which Mr. Miller could file an appeal. The Department
did not receive any response or communication from the appellant during the
extension period.
Subsequently, Mr. Miller called the auditor. The auditor
again reiterated the procedure for filing an appeal. No response was made by the
appellant. The Department processed the audit determination during the beginning
of December to initiate collection.
The appellant finally sent a letter of
appeal on December 11, 1991 setting forth the reasons for the appeal.
The
Department reviewed the appeal with its acxxxnpanying information. The Department
found no reason to alter the audit decision and referred the matter to the
Appeals Tribunal.
REASONING M D COtKHJSICH OF M W :
Section 35-4-10(b) of the Utah Employment Security Act states:
Appeal of QunUlbuticxg Decisions,
(b)
Within ten days after the mailing or personal
delivery of a notice of a determination or decision rendered
following a review und€>r Subsection (a), an employing unit
may appeal to an administrative law judge by filing a notice
of appeal. The administrative law judge shall give notice
of the pendency of the appeal to the cxxnmission which is then
a party to the proceedings.
After* affording the parties
reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing, he shall make
findings and conclusions and on that basis affirm, modify or
reverse the determination.
The parties shall be promptly
notified of the administrative law judge's decision and
furnished a copy of the decision and findings. The decision
is the final decision of the cxxnmission unless within ten
days after the date of mailing of notice to the parties1 last
kncwn addresses or in the absence of a mailing within ten
days after the delivery of notice, further appeal is
initiated under the provisions of this section.
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to this section provide in pertinent
part:
A.

GENERAL DEFINITION

This section of the Act provides the opportunity to
appeal a contribution decision. Examples of decisions which
may be appealed include: Whether an employing unit is an
employer, whether services performed are employment and
determinations
involving contribution liability.
The
provisions of the Rule for Section 35-4-6 (c) which relate to
appeals of benefit decisions are hereby incorporated by

8-129629-0
92-A-2565-T

-3-

Norm Miller Used Cars

reference and, therefore, apply to appeals of contribution
decisions*
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to Section 35-4-6 (c) provide in
pertinent part:
R562-6c-8. Good Cause for Not Filing Within Time Limitations,
A late appeal may be considered on its merits if it is
determined that the appeal was delayed for good cause. Good
cause is limited to circumstances where it is shewn that:
1.
The appeal was filed within 10 days of actual
receipt of the decision if such receipt was beyond the
original appeal period and not the result of willful neglect;
or
2. The delay in filing the appeal was due to circumstances beyond the control of the appellant; or
3. The appellant delayed filing the appeal for circumstances which were ccqpelling and reasonable.
R562-6C-11.

Rescheduling and Adjournment of Hearings,

4. After the Hearing
Any party who fails to participate personally or by
authorized representative at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge may, within seven days after the scheduled
date of the hearing, make a written request for reopening of
the hearing. Such petition will be granted if good cause is
shewn for failing to participate. A request for reopening
made after the scheduled hearing must be in writing; it must
state the reason(s) believed to constitute good cause for
failing to participate at the hearing; and it must be
delivered or mailed within a seven-day period to the Appeals
office or to an office of the Department of Employment
Security or to a Job Service office in any state. If the
request for reopening is not filed within seven days,
reopening will not be granted unless the party can shew good
cause for failing to make the request within the seven day
time limitation. . . If a request for reopening is made, a
hearing will be scheduled and notice will be given or mailed
to each party to the appeal, to determine if there is good
cause for reopening the hearing.
a.
Failure to report as instructed at the time and
place of the scheduled hearing is the equivalent of failing
to participate even if the party reports at another time or
place. In such circumstances, the party must make a written
request for rescheduling and shew good cause in accordance
with these Rules before the matter will be rescheduled.

8-129629-0
92-A-2565-T
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b. Good cause for failing to participate in an appeal
hearing may not include such things as:
(1)
Failure to read and follow instructions on the
notice of hearing,
(2) Failure to arrange personal circumstances such as
transportation or child care,
(3)

Failure to arrange for receipt or distribution of

mail,
(4) Failure to delegate responsibility for participation in the hearing,
(5) Forgetfulness.
The appellant in this case failed to properly follcw the notice of hearing and
accxxnpanying instructions. The appellant's failure to record the date properly
upon his calendar does not constitute good cause to request rescheduling. Thus,
rescheduling is denied.
Nevertheless, if the appellant possessed good cause to request rescheduling, the
Tribunal would hold lack of jurisdiction because the appellant filed an untimely
appeal without good cause. When the Department issued the audit determination,
the appellant received an extension of ten days in which to file an appeal. The
auditor, in addition to written information given to the appellant, explained
verbally to the appellant the need to file a written appeal. The evidence shews
the appellant took no action to establish an appeal until after the Department
processed the audit for collection.
The appellant has not provided any evidence which would demonstrate he was
unable to file a written appeal or was prevented from doing so during the
extended appeal period.
The evidence does not shew the delay in filing the
appeal was due to circumstances beyond the appellant's control or compelling.
The appellant failed to file an appeal in accordance with Section 35-4-10 (b) of
the Utah Employment Security Act.
Therefore, the Department's decision is
considered final.
DECISION:
The appellant does not have good cause to request rescheduling.
In the
alternative, the Tribunal holds the appellant failed to file a timely appeal and
did not have good cause for late filing. Thus, pursuant to Section 35-4-10 (b) of
the Utah Employment Security Act, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the
matter, and the Department's decision remains undisturbed.

Kenneth K,.
Administrative Tm? Judge
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

This decision will become final unless, within tiurty\days from May 22
further written appeal is made to the Board of Review (VO Box 11600, Sal
City, UT 84147) setting forth the grounds upon which the/appeal is made.
KM/jsn
cc:

Norm Miller Used Cars

Employment Security Act

Section 35-4-22(j)(5)(A through T)

(r0
Services performed by an individual for wages or under any contract of
hire, written or oral, express or imp>lied, are deemed to be employment subject
to this act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the commission
that the individual is an independent, contractor. The commission shall analyze
all of the facts in Subsections (A) through (T) under the common-law rules
applicabJc to the employer-employee relationship to determine if an individual
is an independent contractor.
An individual is an independent contractor if
the weight of the evidence supports that finding. The following factors are to
be considered if applicable:
(A) whether the individual works his or her own schedule, or is
required to comply with another person's instructions about when,
where, and how work is to be performed;
(B) whether the individual uses his or her own methods and requires
no specific training from the purchaser, or is trained by an
experienced employee working with nim or her, is required to take
correspondence or other courses, attend meetings, and by other methods
indicates that the employer wants the services performed;
(C)
whether the individual's services are independent of the success
or continuation of a business, or are merged into the business where
success and continuation of the business depends upon those services
and the employer coordinates work with the work of others;
(D)
whether the individual's services may be assigned to others, or
must be rendered personally;
(E)
whether the individual has the right to hire, supervise, and pay
other assistants pursuant to a contract under which the individual is
responsible only for the attainment of a result, or the individual
hires, supervises, and pays workers at the direction of the employer;
(F)
whether the individual was hired to do one job and has no
continuous business relationship with the person for whom the services
are performed, or continues to work for the same person year after
year;
(G)
whether the individual establishes his or her own time schedule,
or does the employer set the time schedule;
(H)
whether the individual is free to work when and for whom he or
she chooses, or is required to devote full-time to the business of the
employer, and is restricted from doing other gainful work;
(I)
whether the individual uses his or her own office, desk,
telephone or other equipment, or is physically within the employer's
direction and supervision;
(J)
whether the individual is free to perform sf d e e s at his or her
own pace, or performs services in the order or sequence set by the
employer;

(K)
whether the individual submits no reports, or is required to
submit regular oral or written reports to the employer;
(I.)
whether the individual is paid by the job or on a straight
commission, or is paid by the employer in regular amounts at stated
intervals;
(M)
whether the individual accounts for his or her own expenses, or
is p<»id by I he employer for expenses;
(N)
whether the individual furnishes his or her own tools, or is
furnished tools and materials by the employer;
(0)
whether the individual has a real, essential, and adequate
investment in the business, or has a lack of investment and depends on
the employer for such facilities;
(P)
whether the individual may realize a profit or suffer a loss as
a result of services performed, or cannot realize a profit or loss by
making good or poor decisions;
(Q)
whether the individual works for a number of persons or firms at
the same time, or usually works for only one employer;
(R)
whether the individual has his or her own office and
assistants, holds a business
license, is listed
in business
directories, maintains a business telephone, or advertises in
newspapers, or does not make services available except through a
business in which he or she Las no interest;
(3)
whether the individual may not be fired or discharged as long as
he or she produces a result which meets contract specifications, or
may be discharged at any time; and
(T)
whether the individual agrees to complete a specific service,
and is responsible for its satisfaction or is legally obligated to
perform the service, or may terminate his or her relationship with the
employer at any time.

For additional information concerning employment status under common law, pi
refer to:
1.
2.

3.

internal Revenue Service Circular E, Employer Tax Guide;
Internal Revenue Service Small Business Tax Workshop publication,
Common Law Factors Defined" and "Comparative Approach of 20 Common
Factors";
Job Service Field Audit Department, 533-2243.
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BOARD OF REVIEW
The Industrial canmissian of Utah
Unegoployinent Oaipensation Appeals

SMH/¥M/lFB/cd

NORM MILLER USED CARS
Employer No. 8-129629-0

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

:

Case No. 92-A-2565-T

:

DECISION

:

Case No. 92-HR-237-T

:

The appellant, Norm Miller Used Cars, appeals the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge which held that the appellant had failed to appeal
an earlier Department decision within the time permitted by Section 35-4-6 (c)
of the Utah Employment Security Act. The ALJ, "therefore, concluded that he
lacked jurisdiction to consider the appellant!s appeal further.
The
Department decision which held that remuneration for services performed by
individuals in behalf of the appellant was subject to liability for
unemployment insurance contributions, pursuant to Sections 35-4-22(j)(1),
35-4-22(p) and 35-4-22(j) (5) of the Act, is still in effect.
After careful consideration of the record in this matter, the
Board of Review finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge to be a
correct application of the provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act,
supported by cconpetent evidence and, therefore, affirms the decision. In so
holding, the Board of Review adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of
law of the Administrative Law Judge.
In this case, the appellant appeals the ALT's denial of
rescheduling for a hearing on the appellant's late appeal. The appellant
argues that he should be granted rescheduling of the hearing because he
recorded the hearing date wrong and thus missed the hearing. The Board of
Review notes, however, that the appellant did not immediately request
rescheduling upon discovering his error as instructed in the instructions
that accompany the Notice of Hearing which state that the hearing should be
requested within seven days. Rather, the appellant waited over two weeks
after discovering the error before requesting rescheduling. The purpose for
the hearing, which the employer missed, was to determine whether the
appellant had good cause for filing his initial appeal over one month late.
Thus, the appellant has established a pattern of late filing of appeals, of
inattention to details regarding the date of appeal hearings, and late
requests for requesting rescheduling of hearings. The Board of Review agrees
with the ALJ that the ertployer has. failed to establish good cause for failing
to make a timely request for rescheduling of the hearing.

NORM MILLER USED CARS
Emp. No, 8-129629-0
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Case No, 92-A-2565-T
Case No, 92-BR-237-T

In its appeal, the appellant also complains about abuses of the
unemployment insurance system. The Board of Review is aware that there are
those who do abuse the unemployment insurance system. The Departirvant has a
Benefit Payment Control unit whose function is to investigate and prosecute
abuses of the system.
The Department needs cooperation, support and
assistance of the citizens to avoid abuses and to cut off further abuse by
those who are abusing the system. The appellant is invited to contact the
Benefit Payment Control unit of the Department and report any evidence which
he has of persons who are abusing the uneirployment insurance system. When
abuses are properly dealt with and controlled, all employers of the State
benefit by a reduction in the costs of the unemployment insurance system.
The appellant may reach the Benefit Payment Control until by calling 536-7616
or 536-7613.
This decision becomes final on the date it is mailed, and any
further appeal must be made within 30 days from the date of mailing. Your
appeal must be submitted in writing to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtown
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. To file an
appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a
Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to
Section 63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and Rule 14 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and
a legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

.BOARD OF REVIEW,

Dated this 27th day of August, 1992.
Date Mailed:

September 1, 1992.

NORM MILLER USED CARS
Enp. No. 8-129629-0
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CERTIFICATE OF MATT TNG

I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct cqpy
of the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following
on this

lst

day of September, 1992, by mailing the same,

postage prepaid, United States mail to:
Norman Miller
Norm Miller Used Cars
P. 0. Box 392
Lehi, UT 84043

frvfyz^z^z^
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ADDENDUM B
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann, S35-4-10(a).lb).(d),(e),(h), and (i)
(a) A review of a decision or determination involving
contribution liability or applications for refund shall be
made by the commission or its authorized representative in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. The decision
of the representative conducting the review is considered the
decision of the commission. The commission or its authorized
representative conducting the review may refer the matter to
an appeal referee, may decide the application for review on
the basis of any facts and information as may be obtained or
may, in its discretion, hear argument or hold a hearing to
secure further facts.
After the review, notice of the
decision shall be given to the employing unit. The decision
made pursuant to the review is the final decision of the
commission unless, within ten days after the date of
notification or mailing of the decision, a further appeal is
initiated under the provisions of this section.
(b) Within ten days after the mailing or personal
delivery of a notice of a determination or decision rendered
following a review under Subsection (a) , an employing unit
may appeal to an appeal referee by filing a notice of appeal.
The appeal referee shall give notice of the pendency of the
appeal to the commission, which is then a party to the
proceedings.
After affording the parties
reasonable
opportunity for a fair hearing, he shall make findings and
conclusions and on that basis affirm, modify, or reverse the
determination. The parties shall be promptly notified of the
referee's decision and furnished a copy of the decision and
findings.
The decision is the final decision of the
commission unless within ten days after the date of mailing
of notice to the parties' last known addresses or in the
absence of a mailing within ten days after the delivery of
notice, further appeal is initiated under the provisions of
this section.
* * *

(d)

(1) * * *
(2) The board of review within the time specified
for the filing of appeals may allow an appeal from a decision
of an appeals referee on application filed within the
designated time by any party entitled to notice of the
decision. An appeal filed by the party shall be allowed as
of right if the decision did not affirm a prior decision.
Upon appeal the board of review may on the basis of the
evidence previously submitted in the case, or upon the basis
of any additional evidence it requires, affirm, modify, or
reverse the findings, conclusions, and decision of the appeal

referee.
The board of review shall promptly notify the
parties to any proceedings before it of its decision,
including its findings and conclusions, and the decision is
final unless within ten days after mailing of notice to the
parties1 last known addresses or in the absence of mailing
within ten days after the delivery of the notification further
appeal is initiated under the provisions of this section.
However, upon denial by the board of review of an application
for appeal from the decision of an appeal referee the decision
of the appeal referee is considered to be a decision of the
board of review within the meaning of this paragraph for
purposes of judicial review and is subject to judicial review
within the time and in the manner provided.
(e) The manner in which disputed matters are presented,
the reports required from the claimant and employing units
and the conduct of hearings and appeals shall be in accordance
with rules prescribed by the commission for determining the
rights of the parties, whether or not the rules conform to
common-law or statutory rules of evidence and other technical
rules of procedure. Whem the same or substantially similar
evidence is relevant and material to the matters in issue in
more than one proceeding, the same time and place for
considering each matter may be fixed, hearings jointly
conducted, a single record of the proceedings made, and
evidence introduced with respect to one proceeding considered
as introduced in the others, if in the judgment of the appeal
referee having jurisdiction of the proceedings, the
consolidation would not be prejudicial to any party. A full
and complete record shall be kept of all proceedings in
connection with a disputed matter.
All testimony at any
hearing upon a disputed matter shall be reported but need not
be transcribed unless the disputed matter is appealed.
* * *

(h) Any decision in the absence of an appeal as provided
becomes final ten days after the date of notification or
mailing and judicial review may be permitted only after any
party claiming to be aggrieved has exhausted his remedies
before the commission and board of review as provided by this
chapter. The commission is a party to any judicial action
involving any decisions and shall be represented in the
judicial action by any qualified attorney employed by the
commission and designated by it for that purpose or at the
commission's request by the attorney general.
(i) Within ten days after the* decision of the board of
review has become final, any aggrieved party may secure
judicial review by commencing an action in the Court of
Appeals against the board of review for the review of its
decision, in which action any other party to the proceeding
before the board of review shall be made a defendant. In that
action a petition, which shall state the grounds upon which

a review is sought, shall be served upon a member of the board
of review or upon that person the board of review designates.
This service is considered completed service on all parties
but there shall be left with the party served as many copies
of the petition as there are defendants and the board of
review shall mail one copy to each defendant. . .
Utah Code Ann, S63-46b-16(4)
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:
* * *

(b) the agency has
conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has
requiring resolution;

acted
not

beyond

decided

the

all

jurisdiction

of

the

issues

(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the
law;
* * *

(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
* * *

(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
UAC R562-6C-7
When it appears that an appeal may not have been
filed within the time allowed by the Act or these Rules,
the appellant will be notified and given an opportunity
to show that the appeal was timely or was delayed for
good cause. If it is found that the appeal was not filed
within the applicable time limit and the delay was
without good cause, the Administrative Law Judge will
not have jurisdiction to consider the merits unless
jurisdiction is established in accordance with provisions
of Section 35-4-6 (b) of the Act.
Any decision with
regard to jurisdictional issues will be issued in writing
and mailed to all interested parties with a clear
statement of the right of further appeal or judicial
review.

UAC R562-6C-8
A late appeal may be considered on its merits if it is
determined that the appeal was delayed for good cause. Good
cause is limited to circumstances where it is show that:
1. The appeal was filed within 10 days of actual receipt
of the decision if such receipt was beyond the original appeal
period and not the result of willful neglect; or
2.
The delay in filing the appeal was due to
circumstances beyond the control of the appellant; or
3.
The appellant delayed filing the appeal for
circumstances which were* compelling and reasonable.
UAC R562-6C-I0.1.a
1. Notice.
a. All interested parties will be notified by mail at
least seven days prior to the hearing . . . .
UAC R562-6C-I0.2.a
2. Hearing of Appeal.
a. All hearings are to be conducted informally and in
such manner as to protect the rights of the parties. All
issues relevant to the appeal will be considered and passed
upon. . . .
UAC R562-6C-11.4
4. After the Hearing.
Any party who fails to participate personally or by
authorized
representative
at
a
hearing
before
an
Administrative Law Judge may, within seven days after the
scheduled date of the hearing, mcike a written request for
reopening of the hearing. Such petition will be granted if
good cause is shown for failing to participate. A request for
reopening made after the scheduled hearing must in writing;
it must state the reason(s) believ€»d to constitute good cause
for failing to participate at the hearing; and it must be
delivered or mailed within a seven-day period to the Appeals
office or to an office of the Department of Employment
Security or a Job Service office in any state. If the request
for reopening is not filed within seven days, reopening will
not be granted unless the party can show good cause for
failing to make the request within the seven-day time
limitation. If a request for reopening is not allowed, a copy
of the decision will be given or mailed to each party, with
a clear statement of the right of appeal or judicial review.
If a request for reopening is made, a hearing will be
scheduled and notice will be given or mailed to each party to
the appeal, to determine if there is good cause for reopening
the hearing.
* * *

b. Good cause for failing to participate in an appeal
hearing may not include such things as:
(1) Failure to read and follow instructions on the notice
of hearing,
(2) Failure to arrange personal circumstances such
as transportation or child care,
(3) Failure to arrange for receipt or distribution
of mail,
(4)
Failure
to
delegate
participation in the hearing,

responsibility

for

(5) Forgetfulness.
UAC R562-10b-l
This section of the Act provides the opportunity to appeal a
contribution decision. . . . The Department will also require
compliance with rule R562-6C which relates to appeals of
benefit decisions and therefore applies to appeals of
contribution decisions.

